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THE ENDS AND MEANS OF DECARBONIZATION: THE
GREEN NEW DEAL IN CONTEXT
BY
JONAS J. MONAST
Disputes about climate policy involve much more than whether
or not to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There is general
agreement among proponents of climate policy that strategies
should be cost effective, address distributional impacts, and
incentivize
investments
in
low-carbon
technologies.
Yet
disagreements abound regarding additional goals of climate policy
design.
Decarbonizing the economy means changing the sources of
energy we use, how we transport people and products, how we
produce food, and which resources we consume. Yet even among
proponents of federal climate legislation there is strong
disagreement regarding policy instruments. Recent proposals for a
revenue-neutral carbon tax and a Green New Deal (GND) frame the
opposite ends of the debate. On one end, the GND framework treats
climate policy as an opportunity to steer the trajectory of the U.S.
economy while also correcting social and environmental injustices.
Proponents of the most expansive iterations of a GND argue that it
is not possible to separate justice and economic considerations from
environmental policy. At the other end of the spectrum, revenueneutral carbon tax proposals reject the creation of new government
programs and focus on controlling greenhouse gas emissions rather
than the economic and social impacts of the policy.
This Essay identifies core disputes about the non-emission
goals in state and federal climate policy debates that create barriers
to legislative consensus. The Essay begins with a comparison of
recent proposals to mitigate climate change, including pricing
carbon via a carbon market or carbon tax, regulatory measures such
as the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, state-based policies, and the
GND. It then identifies three conflicts, the resolution of which will
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shape future climate policy developments: the role of
decarbonization as technology policy, social justice policy, and fiscal
policy. Deploying low carbon technologies is a critical piece of the
climate mitigation puzzle, but stakeholders disagree whether
decarbonization strategies should prioritize renewable energy or
include technologies such as nuclear or carbon capture. Each policy
discussed in this Essay considers some range of social impacts (at
minimum, cost increases), but differ significantly about which social
impacts to address and the how to address them. The policies also
adopt different approaches to the link between fiscal policy and
climate policy, with some generating revenue to fund new
government programs, some returning revenue to U.S. citizens, and
some not addressing the issue. The Essay concludes with comments
about the early impacts of the GND on the domestic policy debate
and opportunities to resolve it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, a new coalition of environmental and social justice
advocates launched the Green New Deal (GND)—a sweeping framework
to mitigate climate change, reduce unemployment, and address other
longstanding social justice and environmental challenges. The GND
quickly became a focal point in the climate policy debate as a new wave
of congressional candidates gave voice to the ideas.1
The GND refocused national attention on climate change, but it
also reinforced the lack of consensus about the proper approach to
mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. At the same time that the
GND was emerging as a new force in the climate policy debate,
1 See, e.g., RHIANA GUNN-WRIGHT & ROBERT HOCKETT, NEW CONSENSUS, THE GREEN
NEW DEAL 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/V7QB-KGGT (describing the origins of the GND).

EXEC REVIEW.MONAST (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

3/10/2020 10:06 AM

THE ENDS AND MEANS OF DECARBONIZATION

23

bipartisan bills were introduced in the House and Senate as companion
bills to create a national cap-and-dividend program that would tax
carbon and redistribute the funds back to taxpayers—the first
bipartisan climate bill introduced in the U.S. Congress since 2010.2
A coalition of companies, environmental organizations, and former
elected officials and high-ranking cabinet officials released a proposal
supporting a similar approach.3 In January 2019, over 3,500 economists
endorsed an editorial published in the Wall Street Journal promoting a
similar idea.4
A revenue-neutral carbon tax and a GND reflect opposite ends of
the climate policy spectrum. On one end, the GND framework
approaches climate policy as an opportunity to steer the trajectory of the
U.S. economy while also correcting social and environmental injustices.
At the other end of the spectrum, revenue-neutral carbon tax proposals
adopt a more traditional approach to environmental policy. These
proposals focus on controlling a class of pollutants rather than the
economic and social impacts of the policy.
The contrast between the GND and carbon tax proposals highlight
a challenge that has long frustrated efforts to decarbonize the economy:
some of the most consequential disagreements about climate policy are
not simply about the best way to reduce the atmospheric concentration
of GHGs. Instead, the conflicts are rooted in fundamentally different
views of the role of government. Achieving the broad-based political
coalition to move climate change legislation through Congress requires
addressing these core conflicts.
Decarbonizing the economy means changing how we power the
economy, transport people and products, produce food, and consume
other natural resources. There is general agreement that climate policy
should be cost effective, should address distributional impacts, and
should incentivize investments in low carbon technologies. Yet
disagreements abound regarding the scope of the problem and the
appropriate responses. Should climate policy allow compliance flexibility
or mandate emission reductions at each facility subject to the policy?
Should climate policy directly address job losses that will occur as the
2 See Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, H.R. 7173, 115th Cong.
(2018); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791, 115th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2018); Noah Kaufman, A Comparison of the Bipartisan Energy Innovation and
Carbon Dividend Act with other Carbon Tax Proposals 2, 4 (Columbia Univ., Ctr. on Glob.
Energy Policy, Working Paper, 2018), https://perma.cc/6MMK-N68B. The bill was
reintroduced at the start of the 116th Congress. Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend
Act of 2019, H.R.763, 116th Cong. (2019).
3 See The Four Pillars of Our Carbon Dividends Plan, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL,
https://perma.cc/N7Y9-KHFN (updated September 2019) [hereinafter CLC Carbon
Dividend Plan].
4 Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://perma.cc/73S3-KY9J. The Climate Leadership Council claims that this is “the
largest public statement of economists in history.” Economists’ Statement on Carbon
Dividends, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/9H9S-EQ5X (last visited Nov.
25, 2019).
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energy system moves toward a lower carbon future? Should
decarbonization policy ensure that new infrastructure does not create
long-term public health and environmental burdens for local
communities? Perhaps most fundamentally, is decarbonization about
pollution mitigation alone, or should it also address the social impacts
resulting from the transition to a low carbon economy?
Policy debates often treat these as questions of strategy (in other
words, the means of decarbonizing). This Essay argues that the
disagreements reflect different views about the core goals of
decarbonization rather than merely the strategies for reducing
emissions. Different stakeholders expect fundamentally different
outcomes and define success in sometimes vastly different terms. Some
expect climate policy to correct past economic and environmental
injustices. Some seek to rigidly define the scope of acceptable energy
technologies while others are agnostic regarding technology choices as
long as the policy results in lower overall GHG emissions over time.
Some prioritize reducing economic burdens on the new policy but give
less attention to other social goals.5
Proponents of the most expansive iterations of a GND argue that it
is not possible to separate justice and economic considerations from
environmental policy, and that politics and equity require addressing
the economic impacts of climate policy as part of a comprehensive
decarbonization effort.6 Decarbonizing the economy necessarily means
that some jobs will disappear and some communities will suffer
economic blows. This is already taking place, as coal-fired power plants,
and the mines supplying their coal, shutter due to low costs of natural
gas and renewable energy.7 The GND takes this challenge on directly by
combining climate policy, economic development, and job guarantees.8
Carbon tax and cap-and-dividend proposals generally include
provisions to help low-income citizens cope with higher energy prices
resulting from the carbon price, but most do not focus on social,
economic, or environmental justice issues.9 For some, the narrow focus

5 This is not to suggest that proponents of different policy mechanisms care more or
less about the particular goals. They may support all of the goals identified in this Essay
but believe that it is a better strategy choice to address other goals using other policy
mechanisms, for example.
6 GUNN-WRIGHT & HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 7.
7 ETHAN BLUMENTHAL, UNC CENTER FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY, ENVT., AND ECON.,
COMMUNITIES IN TRANSITION: STATE RESPONSES TO ENERGY-SECTOR JOB LOSSES 3–7
(2019), https://perma.cc/M7YM-PMW2.
8 GREG CARLOCK & EMILY MANGAN, DATA FOR PROGRESS, A GREEN NEW DEAL 2
(2018), https://perma.cc/9LVQ-4T2S (“The goal of a Green New Deal is to build the 21st
century economy, which by design will mitigate the causes of climate change while
building resilience to its effects, restore the American landscape, and improve access to
clean air and water—all in ways that prioritize justice and equity, and grow the economy
and jobs.”).
9 See, e.g., GEORGE P. SCHULTZ & TED HALSTEAD, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE
DIVIDEND ADVANTAGE 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/8EKG-WYKM (stating that “[c]ombining
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on mitigating climate change may reflect a political calculation. Climate
change is such a critical threat that a targeted response that has a
better chance of collecting the necessary votes in Congress is a
preferable option. For others, the focus on emissions reflects the view
that the critical issue at hand is reducing emissions, not using climate
policy as a legislative vehicle to tackle a host of other societal
challenges. In other words, there is not consensus about whether some
of the social justice issues included in the GND resolution are issues
that government should address and, if they are, whether they should
be directly linked to climate change mitigation.
The Essay begins with a comparison of recent proposals to mitigate
climate change, including pricing carbon via a carbon market or carbon
tax, regulatory measures such as the Obama-era Clean Power Plan,
state-based policies, and the GND.10 It then discusses three important
conflicts, the resolution of which will shape future climate policy
developments: the role of decarbonization as technology policy, social
justice policy, and fiscal policy. Deploying low carbon technologies is a
critical piece of the climate mitigation puzzle, but stakeholders disagree
whether decarbonization strategies should prioritize renewable energy
or include technologies such as nuclear or carbon capture. Each policy
discussed in this Essay considers some range of social impacts (at
minimum, cost increases), but they differ significantly about which
social impacts to address and the how to address them. The policies
adopt different approaches to the link between fiscal policy and climate
policy, with some explicitly using revenue to fund new government
programs, some explicitly rejecting creation of new government
programs, and some not addressing the issue. The Essay concludes with
comments about the early impacts of the GND on the domestic policy
debate. Whether one agrees with the GND framework or not, the
proposal helped launch the most serious national debate about climate
policy since the U.S. House of Representatives passed climate legislation
in 2009.11 The long-term impact of the GND will depend on whether its
carbon fees with dividends solves [the problem of imposing a disproportionate burden on
the least fortunate] and ensures that the most vulnerable come out ahead”).
10 This Essay focuses on state and federal policies specifically targeting greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, but the list only scratches the surface of policy options for mitigating
climate change. For example, renewable energy mandates are important elements in New
York’s and California’s pledges to reach carbon neutrality before the middle of the 21st
century. Jaclyn Brandt, New York Governor Unveils Plan to Double Solar Goal and
Expand Wind, DAILY ENERGY INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/E35M-MD6X (“The
cornerstone of this new goal is an increase of New York’s successful Clean Energy
Standard mandate from 50 percent to 70 percent renewable electricity by 2030.” (quoting
New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo)); California Renewables Portfolio Standard Program:
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, S.B. 100, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). A new book
published by the Environmental Law Institute catalogues “over one thousand legal
options” to reduce U.S. GHG emissions. LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach, eds., 2018).
11 See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: ‘Let a Thousand Climate Proposals Bloom.’
Lawmakers Tee Up GND Alternatives, WASH. POST: POWER POST (Mar. 26, 2019),
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proponents treat the framework as a single, comprehensive legislative
package or as a set of goals that could apply to different types of policy
proposals.
II. DEFINING THE GREEN NEW DEAL
The dominant paradigm for climate policy design assumes that
there is agreement on the end goals (decarbonization), and the
disagreements involve differing viewpoints regarding policy instruments
(e.g., carbon taxes, cap-and-trade programs, mandates, etc.), scope (e.g.,
sector-specific or economy-wide), stringency, and timelines. Climate
policy options are often evaluated based on their impacts on
environmental performance, cost effectiveness, distributional impacts,
and political viability. Many stakeholders often rely on economic
modeling to assess the costs and impacts of different GHG-reduction
pathways and use the results to support a particular emission reduction
strategy.
The GND starts from a different place. Rather than focusing
primarily (or exclusively) on pollution abatement, the GND approaches
the challenge of climate change as part of a much broader socioeconomic challenge.12 GND advocates argue that the energy system and
the economy are at a turning point, and seek to steer both arenas
toward a more just, lower carbon future. The strategy combines the need
to address climate change, the economic opportunities created by
developing and deploying a new generation of energy technologies, the
historic exclusion of many communities in environmental policy design,
and the need for stable employment with meaningful wages and
benefits.
As of the drafting of this Essay, the GND is a conceptual framework
rather than a fully formed legislative proposal. GND proponents in
Congress have yet to specify how they would address the challenging
fiscal and social tradeoffs inherent in such a broad policy change such as
the role of nuclear power, the policy mechanisms to achieve the emission
reductions, and how to fund the proposals.
As a result, the GND acts like a climate version of a Rorschach test,
with proponents and opponents seizing on certain details (or lack
thereof) to extrapolate what the entire concept stands for, from a call for
100% renewable energy to hyperbolic claims that the GND is a “Trojan
Horse for socialism,” or that it will require everyone to become
vegetarians and cease all air travel.13 It is also unclear at this stage
https://perma.cc/KY4K-VPEA; American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R.
2454, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).
12 CARLOCK & MANGAN, supra note 8, at 1 (characterizing the GND as “a transition to
the 21st century economy”).
13 See Annalee Monroe, President Trump is Partly Right About the Democrats’ Green
New Deal, ARIZ. CENT.: FACT CHECK, https://perma.cc/3N97-2VPB (last updated Mar. 18,
2019); David Harsanyi, The 10 Most Insane Requirements of the Green New Deal, THE
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whether the GND is a specific proposal or a set of guiding principles to
inform energy, environmental, and social policy at all levels of
government. The distinction matters. If the GND is a set of guiding
principles, policymakers can approach the GND in steps and incorporate
the goals into numerous existing policy proposals. If it is a single policy
proposal, the success or failure depends on the ability to move a specific
legislative package through the U.S. Congress or state legislatures.
The lack of details did not prevent the idea from breathing new life
into the domestic climate policy debate, however. Almost as soon as the
GND entered the national conscience, the race was on to define it. An
early GND outline released by the Sunrise Movement, a leading
proponent of the GND (and youth movement), advocated for Congress to
create a new “select committee” to develop draft legislation to
implement the GND.14 The Sunrise Proposal called for “[d]ramatically
expand[ing] existing renewable power sources and deploy[ing] new
production capacity.”15 Although it calls for “meeting 100% of national
power demand through renewable sources,” the proposal does not
require that outcome.16 Other language calls for “eliminating
greenhouse gas emissions” from transportation, manufacturing,
agriculture, “and other industries,” but the provisions do not specify
technologies for achieving the goals.17
Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey introduced a
non-binding congressional resolution in February 2019 that
incorporated much of the Sunrise Foundation’s framework.18 The
resolution’s “whereas” clauses point to declining life expectancy, wage
stagnation, a range of social and economic injustices, and threats to
national security.19 Responding to these challenges, the GND calls for a
“10-year national mobilization” to achieve net-zero GHG emissions,
create jobs, invest in sustainable infrastructure and industries, secure
clean air and water (and other necessities to ensure health and
environmental protection), and promote justice and equity.20

FEDERALIST,
https://perma.cc/3K89-URP7 (last visited Oct. 17, 2019); Thomas J.
Donohue, The Green New Deal Is a Trojan Horse for Socialism, U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE (Feb. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/AAU2-VG42.
14 DRAFT TEXT FOR PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO HOUSE RULES FOR 116TH CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, https://perma.cc/CK46-RJVU; see also Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s
Platform, OCASIO 2018, https://perma.cc/9DVN-6UMT (last visited Oct.15, 2019) (U.S. Rep.
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez incorporated the GND into her campaign platform).
15 DRAFT TEXT FOR PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO HOUSE RULES FOR 116TH CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, § (6)(A)(i) (Committees, Commissions, and House
Offices).
16 Id.
17 Id. § (6)(A)(iv)–(v) (Committees, Commissions, and House Offices).
18 Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal, H.R.
Res. 109, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019) [hereinafter Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND
Resolution].
19 Id. at 3–4.
20 Id. at 5–6.
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References to the GND in this Essay refer to the Ocasio-Cortez–
Markey Resolution unless otherwise noted, but it is far from the only
version. Thomas Friedman proposed a GND in a 2007 New York Times
column.21 President Barack Obama incorporated the concept into his
2008 presidential campaign and incorporated elements of a GND
approach into the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by
linking economic recovery with large investments in clean energy
technologies.22 Numerous commenters have published recent editorials
promoting various strategies for the GND.23 Proponents, critics, and
2020 Democratic presidential candidates continue debating the proper
scope of a GND and the merits of policy ambition versus pragmatism.24
New York adopted a narrower GND strategy that promotes renewable
energy and energy innovation and articulates a list of specific policy
goals.25 The state strategy follows recent announcements that the
renewable energy would make up seventy percent of the state’s
electricity mix by 2030 and that the electricity sector would be carbonneutral by 2040.26
III. THE GREEN NEW DEAL IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S. CLIMATE POLICY
The GND refocused national attention on climate change in the
early days of the 116th Congress, but it also highlights the lack of
consensus about the core goals for climate policy. As the GND entered
the nation’s lexicon, the Climate Leadership Council (CLC)—a
bipartisan advocacy group with corporate members as well as prominent
scientists, economists, and former high-ranking government officials—
called for implementing a national carbon tax that returned tax revenue
to U.S. citizens.27 Lawmakers in the House of Representatives and

21 Thomas L. Friedman, A Warning from the Garden, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2007),
https://perma.cc/M2CB-94AT.
22 David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOX, https://perma.cc/R5FX-6V8V
(last updated Mar. 30, 2019) (providing a brief summary of the evolution of the GND
concept).
23 See Noah Smith, The Green New Deal Would Spend the U.S. Into Oblivion,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/5XK9-5TBT; Thomas L. Friedman, The Green
New Deal Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/23DL-UD8Z.
24 Samuel Whillans, Many Shades of the Green New Deal, THE REGULATORY REVIEW
(Dec. 12, 2019), (describing Democratic presidential candidates’ climate platforms), https://
https://perma.cc/ZF7R-MHW8; Emily Holden, What is the Green New Deal and is It
Technically Possible?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/8PAK-B6UL.
25 GOV. ANDREW M. CUOMO, NEW YORK STATE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND RACIAL JUSTICE
AGENDA: 2019 STATE OF THE STATE 312–29 (2019) [hereinafter N.Y. 2019 STATE OF THE
STATE], https://perma.cc/5AG6-NU8P; Governor Cuomo Announces Green New Deal
Included in 2019 Executive Budget, N.Y. STATE (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/BCK7DFGX; see also Howie Hawkins, The Green New Deal New York Needs, From Its Original
Source, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/D9ER-4DVW (criticizing Gov.
Cuomo’s GND for not going far enough).
26 N.Y. 2019 STATE OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 315.
27 CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3.
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Senate introduced companion bipartisan bills to establish a cap-anddividend strategy similar to that proposed by the CLC.28 In contrast to
the GND’s broad approach to addressing climate change and social
justice, the cap-and-dividend legislation focuses on GHG emissions
exclusively. Rather than utilizing tax revenues to fund job creation and
technology innovation, for example, the cap-and-dividend approach
returns revenues collected through the program back to consumers
rather than create new government programs.
This Part provides an overview of two general climate policy
strategies implemented or proposed in the last decade—carbon pricing
and regulatory mandates—and discusses their similarities and
differences with the GND.29 Beyond the core trait that these policies
share in common—reducing GHG emissions—they aim to achieve very
different outcomes. Some focus primarily on GHG emissions. Some seek
to reduce energy and environmental burdens faced by underserved
communities. All seek to incentivize investment in new zero-carbon
generation, but some mandate specific energy technologies while others
focus on emission levels rather than technologies. Most, but not all, aim
to address the distributional impacts of policies that increase energy
prices.30 Part III builds upon this overview by exposing the underlying
conflicts inherent in the climate policy strategies discussed here.
A. Pricing Carbon
Market mechanisms—carbon markets and carbon taxes—have
dominated the domestic climate policy debate. Coupling a price on
carbon with compliance flexibility allows firms with high abatement
costs to continue emitting GHGs and pay the price (by purchasing capand-trade allowances or paying the carbon tax). Firms with lower
abatement costs may reduce their emissions and thus avoid paying the
carbon price (by avoiding the carbon tax or the need to purchase
allowances, or by selling the allowance in a carbon market). Marketbased policies are generally agnostic regarding whether individual
facilities reduce emissions or pay the carbon price. As long as the
emissions cap or carbon tax are set at an appropriate level, overall
emissions should drop over time.
The 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman–
Markey Bill), introduced by then-Representatives Henry Waxman and

28 Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, H.R. 7173, 115th Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 9902, 9512 (2018); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791,
115th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 9902, 9512 (2018).
29 This list only scratches the surface of options for reducing emissions. It does not
include tax incentives or research and development funding, for example. A new book
published by the Environmental Law Institute catalogues “over one thousand legal
options” to reduce U.S. GHG emissions. LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 10, at 1.
30 Id.
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Edward Markey, remains the high-water mark for the federal climate
policy debate. The bill, which passed the U.S. House of Representatives
but did not come up for a vote in the U.S. Senate, would have
established a nationwide carbon market with an emissions cap that
became more stringent over time and provided funding to support
multiple policy goals via allowance auction revenue.31 The bill included
specific rules for allowance allocation and auctioning, mechanisms to
protect energy-intensive industries whose competitiveness could be
jeopardized by higher energy prices resulting from the carbon price,
offsets provisions, and a market oversight regime.32 The Waxman–
Markey Bill also included a federal renewable portfolio standard, energy
efficiency incentives, and other policies to support energy innovation.33
Although the Waxman–Markey Bill did not become law, two statebased carbon markets are currently operating, one in Northeastern and
Mid-Atlantic states and the other in California.34 The states
participating in these markets supplement the carbon price with
renewable portfolio standards and other incentives to encourage
deployment of clean energy technologies.35
The CLC and Washington State carbon dividend proposals are the
latest developments in carbon pricing proposals.36 They build upon capand-dividend legislation introduced in 2009 by U.S. Senators Maria
Cantwell and Susan Collins. That bill called for an 83% reduction in
GHG emissions between 2005 and 2050.37 If enacted, the Cantwell–
Collins bill would have established a “Carbon Revenue Trust Fund” to
return 74% of the revenue to U.S. citizens.38
The CLC proposal calls for an initial $40 per ton carbon tax that
increases over time.39 The plan, which the CLC promotes as a
“conservative climate solution,” rejects creating new government
programs. Instead, the CLC calls for returning revenue to all American
citizens “on an equal and monthly basis.”40 The proposal also calls for a
border tax adjustment to protect domestic companies that may be
31 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman–Markey Bill), H.R.
2454, 111th Cong. § 721 (2009).
32 Id. §§ 241–43, 721–24, 731, 732.
33 Id. tit. I–II.
34 Letter from RGGI Member States, to Members of Congress (Oct. 31, 2007); CAL.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., OVERVIEW OF ARB EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM
(2015), https://perma.cc/HZJ5-BFZD.
35 Renewables
Portfolio
Standard—RPS,
CAL.
ENERGY
COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/7PQN-A39A (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (“The Renewables Portfolio
Standard (RPS) is one of California’s key programs for advancing renewable energy.”).
36 CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3; Initiative Measure No. 1631 (Wash.
2018), https://perma.cc/A4QR-TXTK.
37 Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877, 111th
Cong. (2009).
38 Id. § 2.
39 JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE
CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017).
40 Id.
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vulnerable to competition with imported goods from countries without
similar carbon prices.41 The final prong of the CLC proposal—
preempting state climate policies, preventing lawsuits based on a
company’s contribution to climate change, and scaling back some
existing environmental regulations42—may prove far more controversial,
as it aims to trade climate policy for existing protections against
harmful pollutants.
Lawmakers in the House of Representatives and Senate introduced
bipartisan companion bills to establish a cap-and-dividend strategy
similar to the carbon dividend approach proposed by the CLC.43 In
contrast to the GND’s broad approach to addressing climate change and
social justice, the cap-and-dividend legislation is an example of a
narrower focus on GHG emissions specifically and represents a strategy
choice to return revenues collected through to the program back to
consumers rather than create new government programs.
Despite the renewed enthusiasm for taxing carbon in some
Washington, D.C. circles, failed carbon tax ballot measures in
Washington State in 2016 and 2018 are sobering reminders of the
hurdles facing climate policy proposals.44 The 2016 proposal would have
used carbon tax revenues to reduce income taxes.45 The 2018 measure
took a different approach. Rather than using the carbon tax to offset
income tax, the 2018 proposal used revenue to reduce GHG emissions
through investments in clean energy, energy efficiency, and
transportation.46
B. Clean Air Act Regulations and Clean Energy Targets
The domestic climate policy debate has been in disarray since
Congress failed to enact the 2009 Waxman–Markey Bill. The Obama
Administration turned to regulatory measures to address GHG
emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA), a process that abruptly ended
with the election of Donald Trump.47 Shortly after taking office, the
Trump Administration initiated the process for withdrawing from the
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Id.
Id.
43 Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, H.R. 7173, 115th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2018); Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act of 2018, S. 3791, 115th Cong.,
2d Sess. (2018).
44 Washington Initiative 732—Create Carbon Emission Tax—Results: Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/W4Q3-HGKT; Washington Election Results, N.Y.
TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/XRR8-PVMJ.
45 Initiative Measure No. 732, § 2 (Wash. 2015), https://perma.cc/NER6-D2LC.
46 Initiative Measure No. 1631, § 4 (Wash. 2018), https://perma.cc/S7A5-RGQC.
47 Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/JDC6-SNY4 (last updated June 19, 2019); Repeal of the Clean
Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84
Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
42
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Paris Agreement and is undoing many of the Obama-era CAA
regulations targeting GHG emissions.48
The Obama-era Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) efforts
culminated with the Clean Power Plan, which targeted GHG emissions
from existing power plants.49 The rule created state-specific emissions
targets calculated based on three criteria: improving efficiency at
existing coal-fired power plants; increasing the use of existing natural
gas facilities; and increasing or maintaining generation from zeroemitting sources (including renewable and nuclear facilities).50 The
Clean Power Plan granted states wide latitude to develop their own
plans to meet the targets. The rule included incentives for renewable
energy and energy efficiency investments in low-income communities, as
well as instructions for states to consider environmental justice impacts
of their compliance plans, but the CAA limited the EPA’s ability to
otherwise address other policy goals.
The rule did not require states to adopt market mechanisms in
their respective compliance plans, but it did identify trading as an
option and outlined two trading options—one based directly on carbon
dioxide emissions and one based on power plant heat-rate efficiency.
The Obama administration also adopted CAA rules targeting GHG
emissions from motor vehicles and other stationary sources. These rules
did not include the same degree of compliance flexibility as the Clean
Power Plan, nor did they aim to address distributional impacts of the
policies or drive investment in specific communities.
State renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) mandate renewable
energy generation.51 These policies may support state GHG reduction
goals, but the RPS requirements are generally not directly linked to
GHG emission targets. Some states have opted for clean energy
standards rather than renewable portfolio standards to incorporate
incentives for carbon capture technologies and nuclear energy.52 Other

48 What is the Paris Climate Agreement, UNFCC, https://perma.cc/Q4LC-XKLM (last
visited Jan. 25, 2020); see Lisa Friedman, Trump Administration to Begin Official
Withdrawal From Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2019) https://perma.cc/22S5VH3E (discussing the Trump Administration’s initiation of the formal process to remove
the United States from the Paris Climate Accord); Carol Davenport, Trump to Revoke
California’s Authority to Set Stricter Auto Emission Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019)
https://perma.cc/BU59-74Z2 (discussing the Trump Administration’s rollback of the
Obama-era Clean Air standards, specifically the revocation of the waiver granted to
California allowing the enactment of stricter standards at the state level).
49 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units; Final Rule (Clean Power Plan), 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661–64,662 (Oct.
23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
50 Jeremy M. Tarr & David Hoppock, Apples and Oranges: Assessing the Stringency of
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,079, 11,080 (2014).
51 Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 3,
2012), https://perma.cc/F27D-BYXM.
52 See, e.g., Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard (N.Y. Clean Energy Standard),
N.Y. P.S.C. Op. No. 15-E-0302, at 3, 13–14, 19–20 (2016) https://perma.cc/4F9G-MRTB.
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states have revised renewable energy mandates to require significantly
higher rates of renewable generation.53
A growing number of states with RPSs, including some that
participate in state-based carbon markets, are also implementing new
policy mandates and targets to reduce their respective GHG emissions.
Some in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest have recently
implemented Zero Emission Credit programs requiring load-serving
entities to compensate economically vulnerable nuclear power plants for
the attribute of zero-carbon baseload electricity generation.54 Seven
states and the District of Columbia announced GHG-reduction targets
in 2019, committing to carbon neutral electricity sectors between 2040
and 2050.55 This group of states has not identified specifically how they
will achieve the targets, but they will depend in part on aggressive
RPSs.
C. The Green New Deal
The GND dwarfs each of the policies described in the preceding
subsections in terms of scope, emission reduction ambition, and
timeline. Nonetheless, the framework outlined by Representative
Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey shares traits with many of them.
Like the GND, the Waxman–Markey Bill sought to reduce emissions
throughout the U.S. economy rather than focusing on a specific sector
and included both environmental and social goals.56 Both approaches
would include funding to support technology innovation, help coaldependent communities mitigate job losses, and link energy efficiency,
renewable energy, and climate policies under one umbrella. The Clean
Power Plan incentivized investments in low-income areas and required
states to consider environmental justice concerns when developing
compliance plans—again a far cry from the ambition of the GND but
still an example of incorporating social justice concerns into climate
mitigation measures.

53 GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS: 2019 ANNUAL STATUS UPDATE 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/SXN4-JHRB (noting
that “ten states enacted higher RPS targets”).
54 See, e.g., N.Y. Clean Energy Standard, N.Y. P.S.C. Op. No. 15-E-0302, at 20; Illinois
Power Agency Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) (2018); An Act Concerning Zero
Carbon Solicitation and Procurement, S.B. 1501, Sess. Year 2017, June Spec. Sess., Pub.
Act No. 17-3 § 1(1)(d)–(e) (Conn. 2017).
55 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Maine and New York Become the 6th and 7th States to
Adopt 100% Clean Electricity Targets, EIA.GOV (Sept. 26, 2019) https://perma.cc/XUA3PWEN; Executive Order B-55-18 to Achieve Carbon Neutrality (Cal. Sept. 10, 2018); Fact
Sheet: State and Utility Climate Change Targets Shift to Carbon Reductions, Technology
Diversity, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE (May 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/3BP9-LUR7; Robert
Walton, Hawaii First State to Enact 100% Carbon Neutral Goal, UTIL. DIVE (June 5,
2018), https://perma.cc/Q5NV-8TB3/.
56 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 702
(2009).
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The GND is perhaps most similar to state carbon neutrality goals.
The state timelines are longer than the GND—aiming for carbon
neutrality between 2040 and 2050 rather than the GND’s 10-year goal—
but the states and the GND set specific targets that depend upon
technologies that do not currently exist.
Yet the carbon pricing and regulatory mandates discussed here are
traditional environmental laws at heart. Their primary, or sole, aim is
to reduce pollution. The GND is as much “new deal” as it is “green.” It
redefines the climate challenge as something larger than environmental
policy. In doing so, the GND also challenges the traditional approaches
to carbon reductions, both in terms of scope and stringency.
IV. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT CLIMATE POLICY
Decarbonization policy substitutes for, or significantly alters, many
existing policies. Decarbonization may function as energy policy by
influencing the means by which we produce and consume energy.
Decarbonization may function as transportation policy by changing
automobile technologies, altering transportation options, or lowering the
carbon content of fuels.57 Carbon offset markets may function as
agriculture policy, providing incentives for farmers to adopt new
practices or set aside land for conservation. These are explicit strategies
designed to target major sources of GHG emissions.
Decarbonization may take the form of international trade policy.
Many federal proposals seek to protect certain industries vulnerable to
international competition from businesses not subject to a carbon price,
for example.58 The Waxman–Markey Bill included specific provisions to
protect “energy intensive, trade-exposed” industries, as well as border
tax adjustments.59 The CLC carbon dividend proposal adopts the border
tax adjustment approach as one of its four core elements.60 Climate
policy may also provide a platform for nations to achieve other
international relations goals.61
Decarbonization policies also often include elements of industrial
policy, as they provide incentives to develop new economic sectors and
transform technologies used in other sectors.62 The timing of emission
57 Compliance
Offset Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD. (Oct. 20, 2019),
https://perma.cc/7XMR-8QNS (providing links to carbon offset protocols).
58 See, e.g., CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3, § 4.
59 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 782(e)
(2009).
60 CLC Carbon Dividend Plan, supra note 3, § 4.
61 Matthew Ranson & Robert N. Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture
Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403, 426 (2013); Robert O.
Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change 18 (Harvard Project
on Int’l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 10-33, 2010).
62 See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 39, at 4 (“Exports by companies in sectors with
greater than 5% energy cost in final value should have any carbon taxes rebated on
leaving the United States. Finally, non-emissive fossil fuel products (e.g. asphalt for road
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reduction requirements may also have direct industrial policy
implications. A rapid transition would likely have a much greater cost,
lock in use of existing technologies, cause rapid job losses in some
sectors and create jobs in other sectors.
This Part focuses on three cross-cutting categories that are often
not treated as core goals of decarbonization, but where disagreement
may pose barriers to reaching consensus on climate policy proposals:
technology policy, social justice policy, and fiscal policy.
A. Decarbonization as Technology Policy
The technology policy debate breaks down along two fault lines:
1) whether climate policy should promote renewable energy or “clean”
energy and 2) how to incentivize investments in innovative technologies.
The “renewables versus clean” distinction turns on whether a low
carbon future should include nuclear energy or fossil fuel-fired
generation with carbon capture.63 A growing number of states are
implementing renewable or clean energy mandates. This is already a
major factor in GND discussions and could sway some stakeholders’
opinions about the wisdom of the GND approach generally.64 States are
also taking different approaches to the question, with some
implementing aggressive new renewable energy mandates and others
adopting clean energy mandates.65
A key trait of carbon taxes and carbon markets is compliance
flexibility. The focus is on emissions, not the technologies that are
deployed. These approaches are agnostic regarding the “renewables
versus clean” argument. Even though carbon pricing schemes do not
mandate renewable energy, they create favorable economic conditions
for lower carbon forms of energy. They may operate in parallel with
technology incentives or mandates. For example, the Waxman–Markey
Bill combined a carbon market, a national renewable portfolio standard,
and technology funding in a single legislative package.66 Although New
York is part of the RGGI carbon market, the state also utilizes a Zero
use) should be exempt, with a refund for any tax previously paid.”); Jonas Meckling et al.,
Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy, 349 SCI. 1170, 1171 (2015) (discussing incentives
for green industrial policy).
63 See, e.g., Joshua S. Goldstein & Staffan A. Qvist, Only Nuclear Energy Can Save the
Planet, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/C2UK-C4R3; Jesse Jenkins & Samuel
Thernstrom, We Need More Than Solar and Wind to Power the Green New Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/WEY6-757J.
64 Dino Granini, The Energy 202, The Green New Deal Is Already Sparking Debate over
Nuclear Energy, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/FXW2-A8YR.
65 See, e.g., Iulia Gheorgiu, As 100% Renewables Mandate Nears, Puerto Rico Sees New
Microgrid Initiative, Resilience Focus, UTIL. DRIVE (Mar. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/5QZQTMJK; Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, N.Y., Governor Cuomo Announces
Establishment of Clean Energy Standard that Mandates 50 Percent Renewables by 2030
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/EV7Y-QQRM.
66 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman–Markey Bill), H.R.
2454, 111th Cong. tit. I, III (2009).
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Emission Credit program to help keep existing nuclear plants
economically-viable in the state’s electricity market.67 Similarly, New
York and California recently announced ambitious new renewable
energy requirements for the electricity grid operators in their respective
states.68 These requirements operate in parallel with the RGGI and
California carbon markets.
Renewable energy mandates and some GND proposals treat the
makeup of the energy generation mix as a central feature of
decarbonization policy rather than as a means by which to achieve the
goal of decarbonization. As noted above, the initial GND framework
called for “meeting 100% of national power demand through renewable
sources.”69 The language in the Ocasio-Cortez-Markey resolution is more
ambiguous. The resolution does not discuss nuclear power, instead
calling for “meeting 100 percent of [U.S. energy needs] through clean,
renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.”70 The resolution’s
language leaves the door open to nuclear and other non-renewable low
carbon technology options, but the issue is, thus far, not resolved among
proponents of the GND.71
There is more common ground regarding technology innovation, as
it is an important part of any serious climate policy strategy.72
Furthermore, a constraint on emissions may induce firms to invest in
new technologies to reduce costs.73 The line between technology
mandates versus incentives and flexibility is thus less stark than the
renewables versus clean debate discussed above. Nonetheless, there are
important differences of opinion regarding the appropriate strategies to
promote innovation.
The CLC Carbon Dividend Plan relies solely on the carbon price to
incentivize investments in low carbon technologies.74 Including
predictable increases in the carbon tax policy allows businesses subject
to the tax to make long-term investments to reduce emissions, and thus
67

N.Y. Clean Energy Standard, N.Y. P.S.C. Or. No. 15-E-0302, at 3, 13–14 (2016).
N.Y. 2019 STATE OF THE STATE, supra note 25, at 313–15. California now requires
fifty-percent renewable energy by 2030. Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act of
2015, S.B. 350, ch. 547 (Ca. 2015).
69 DRAFT TEXT FOR PROPOSED ADDENDUM TO HOUSE RULES FOR 116TH CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 14, § 6(A)(i).
70 Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND Resolution, supra note 18, at 7.
71 See, e.g., Jeff Brady, Transcript, Despite Few Details and Much Doubt, The Green
New Deal Generates Enthusiasm, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/6RBMU38P (“Green New Deal backers say they also want to eventually phase out nuclear
energy.”).
72 Joseph P. Tomain, “Our Generation’s Sputnik Moment”: Regulating Energy
Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 392–93 (2011).
73 David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641, 644 (2003).
74 BAKER ET AL., supra note 39, at 1–2 (claiming that a $40 per ton carbon tax would
“send a powerful market signal that encourages technological innovation and largescale
substitution of existing energy and transportation infrastructures, thereby stimulating
new investment”).
68
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reduce compliance costs. This, in turn, incentivizes investments in new
energy technologies, as well as efficiency improvements. Returning all
revenue to citizens rather than using at least a portion of the carbon tax
payments to fund technology research, financial incentives, subsidies, or
direct purchases may leave critical gaps in the technology development
pipeline unless sufficient funding for research, development, and
deployment are available through other government programs.75
B. Decarbonization as Social Justice Policy
A core premise of the GND is that addressing climate change
requires addressing broader socioeconomic challenges. The U.S.
electricity sector is already moving away from coal in favor of natural
gas and renewable energy, resulting in public health and environmental
benefits, but also causing job losses in coal-dependent communities.76
Accelerating a move to clean energy will increase job losses unless
federal and state policymakers address the problem. The GND calls for
“achiev[ing] net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just
transition for all communities and workers,”77 seeking to correct past
social and environmental burdens and avoid creating new burdens in
the process.78 This approach includes, but is not limited to,
environmental policy concerns.79
No other policies included in this Essay go as far as the GND to
address social justice concerns, but each of them considers at least the
direct economic impacts of the new policy, and some go well beyond the
direct economic impacts to address other social impacts. The social
justice provisions in some of the programs included in this section—
particularly the Clean Power Plan—are limited because the authorizing
statute focuses on pollution control but does not authorize the agency to
directly address justice concerns. Others, such as RGGI, are limited
because they focus on one sector. The recent carbon tax, cap-anddividend, and GND proposals are not constrained by preexisting policy
constraints. Instead, they demonstrate the continuing disagreements
regarding the meaning of social justice, the role of climate policy in
addressing the justice needs, and the proper balance between social
justice concerns and other climate policy goals.
75 Current examples of technology innovation policies that support GHG emissionreduction goals include the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects AgencyEnergy (ARPA-E), renewable energy tax credits, and numerous funding opportunities for
technology research and development. See, e.g., ARPA-E.GOV, https://perma.cc/AKS9H7B9 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020); 2017 Renewable Energy Tax Credits, ENERGY STAR,
https://perma.cc/UP5J-UCDB (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
76 See BLUMENTHAL, supra note 7, at 3–7.
77 Ocasio-Cortez–Markey GND Resolution, supra note 18, at 5.
78 Darren McCauley & Raphael Heffron, Just Transition: Integrating Climate, Energy
and Environmental Justice, ENERGY POL’Y, Aug. 2018, at 1.
79 Alice Kaswan, Expanding Environmental Justice to Achieve a Just Transition,
REGULATORY REVIEW (Sept. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/2WS2-AP5J.
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As noted previously, the Waxman–Markey Bill included numerous
provisions to address the impacts of higher energy prices on low income
citizens, the geographic disparities in the energy mix, and the inevitable
job losses that would result from a move to a lower carbon economy.80
Some stakeholders criticized the Waxman–Markey approach due to its
reliance on emissions trading.81 The bill sought to steer the U.S.
economy to a low carbon future, but it did not include specific provisions
to ensure that the energy transition reduced pollution in burdened
communities. Large emitters of GHGs would have to reduce emissions
or purchase allowances, but carbon markets leave those decisions to the
individual operators.
If the federal climate debate was not sufficiently responsive to
environmental justice critiques, the arguments have had much more
resonance in California. The statute authorizing California’s Cap-andTrade Program included both substantive and procedural requirements
to address environmental justice concerns about pollution hot spots and
ensuring that the program delivers economic benefits to disadvantaged
communities. 82
The CAA limited the EPA’s options for incorporating social justice
considerations in the 2015 Clean Power Plan, for example. There was
ongoing debate, and unresolved lawsuits, challenging what options were
allowed under the CAA.83 It was clear, however, that the current CAA
does not authorize EPA to collect revenue from a GHG emissions
trading program and use the funds to target social justice goals. Instead,
the EPA required states to engage vulnerable communities during the
rule development process.84 The Clean Power Plan also included an
optional Clean Energy Incentive Program that, inter alia, encouraged
energy efficiency investments in low-income communities to distribute
the rule’s benefits.85 The EPA was criticized by some environmental
80 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 264
(2009).
81 Bryan Walsh, What the Energy Bill Really Means for Co2 Emissions, TIME (June 27,
2009), https://perma.cc/5PW9-CWR6.
82 Alice Kaswan, A Broader Vision for Climate Policy: Lessons from California, 9 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 83, 88–92 (2018).
83 LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480, CLEAN
POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA
(Mar. 8, 2017).
84 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,670 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R pt. 60). (requiring states to “include in their initial submittals a description of how
they engaged with vulnerable communities as they developed their initial submittals, as
well as the means by which they intend to involve communities and other stakeholders as
they develop their final plans”) (hereinafter CPP Final Rule); Executive Order 12,898
instructs federal agencies to “make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations.” Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994).
85 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,829.
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justice advocates for allowing emissions trading as a compliance
option.86
Carbon tax proposals focus primarily on mitigating GHG emissions
and, to varying degrees, mitigating the economic impacts of the policies
on vulnerable citizens or business sectors.
For example, the CLC Carbon Dividend Plan does not address
social justice directly, but the proposal notes that a greater portion of
dividend payments would flow to lower income households, thus
redistributing carbon tax revenue and potentially helping those families
cope with higher energy costs.87 The 2018 Washington State carbon fee
ballot initiative dedicated five percent of the fee revenue “to prepare
communities for the impacts of climate change and to help certain
populations who are particularly affected by climate change.”88
The RGGI carbon market similarly does not address the burdens
placed on communities near power plants, nor does it provide direct
funding to address social issues. The states participating in the RGGI
market do direct a large portion of their respective share of the auction
revenue to support energy efficiency improvements to reduce energy
bills, however.89 These different policy approaches highlight two lessons
for decarbonization and social justice. First, and most obviously, there is
no consensus about incorporating social goals into decarbonization
strategies to begin with. Some policies address direct economic impacts
of higher energy prices or job losses. Others take a much broader
approach.
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, there is not agreement
about the scope of social goals among stakeholders that support
incorporating justice concerns in climate policy. Environmental justice
advocates remain some of the strongest critics of market mechanisms,
which may put them at odds with consumer protection advocates
seeking to minimize the cost of reducing GHG emissions.90 Climate
policy may create distributional impacts, placing higher costs and
burdens on certain communities or regions of the country.91 Other
stakeholders and scholars argue for focusing on energy justice or climate

86 See, e.g., Emily Holden, Inside the Uphill Battle Against Carbon Trading, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/F5HC-EZ2V.
87 SCHULTZ & HALSTEAD, supra note 9, at 3.
88 Initiative
Measure No. 1631, VOTERS’ GUIDE 2018 GEN. ELECTION,
https://perma.cc/PXV7-87P3 (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
89 REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, THE INVESTMENTS OF RGGI PROCEEDS IN 2016,
at 3 (2018) (“Energy efficiency makes up 55 percent of 2016 RGGI investments and 58
percent of cumulative investments. Programs funded by these investments in 2016 are
expected to return $822.8 million in lifetime energy bill savings to over 176,000
participating households and 2,430 businesses in the region.”).
90 Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring Pope
Francis’ Challenge, 80 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 135, 147–52 (2017).
91 See, e.g., Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus
Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293, 304 (2010) (discussing the distributional impacts of carbon
markets and carbon taxes).

EXEC REVIEW.MONAST(DO NOT DELETE)

40

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

3/10/2020 10:06 AM

[Vol. 50:21

justice, in addition to other social concerns.92 This is not to suggest that
each of these framings of social and environmental justice are
necessarily at odds with one another, but it is important to recognize
that general agreement about the need to address the social impacts of
climate and energy policy does not lead to a single outcome.
C. Decarbonization as Fiscal Policy
A third source of conflict among the policies discussed in this Essay
is whether climate policy instruments should generate government
revenue and, if so, whether it should fund climate-related government
programs or enter the general government coffers. For example, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Waxman–Markey Bill
would have “[i]ncrease[d] federal revenues by about $846 billion[] and
[i]ncrease[d] direct spending by about $821 billion,” resulting in an
estimated $24 billion surplus between 2009 and 2019.93 The bill
allocated the auction revenue to, inter alia, help low- and moderateincome households with energy costs, prevent international
deforestation, fund domestic and international adaptation efforts,
support research and development of new technologies, and help U.S.
workers transition away from fossil fuel-dependent industries.94
Opponents criticized the bill as simply creating a new big government
program rather than staying tightly focused on mitigating climate
change.95
The RGGI carbon market generates auction revenue for the
participating states.96 The states generally use the revenue to support
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and low-income assistance
programs, but that is not required in order to participate in the RGGI
program.97
The debate also plays out among carbon tax proponents. Some
argue that a carbon tax should replace a federal payroll tax or be used to
supplement federal taxes to fill budget gaps and control the deficit.98
92 Kirsten Jenkins, Setting Energy Justice Apart from the Crowd: Lessons from
Environmental and Climate Justice, 39 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 117, 118 (2018);
Environmental & Climate Justice, NAACP, https://perma.cc/ZAE7-W5LL (last visited Jan.
25, 2020) (distinguishing between “climate justice” and “environmental justice,” and
providing examples of the interaction between the two concepts); Maxine Burkett, Just
Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for A Domestic Clean
Development Mechanism, 56 BUFFALO L. REV. 169, 188–92 (2008).
93 Waxman–Markey Bill, supra note 31, at 359.
94 Id. at 89.
95 See, e.g., Rich Lowry, The Waxman-Markey Travesty, NAT’L. REV. (June 30, 2009),
https://perma.cc/R37P-KPU7 (accusing the architects of the Waxman–Markey Bill of using
auction revenue to “[buy] off every possible interest group”).
96 Elements of RGGI, RGGI (2019), https://perma.cc/FET9-GS3S.
97 Id.
98 JERRY TAYLOR, NISKANEN CTR., THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX (Mar.
23, 2015), https://perma.cc/72E3-9HXY; Gore Says Tax Pollution, Not Payrolls, ENVTL.
NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 19, 2006), https://perma.cc/FLP5-U7GB.
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Republican Representative Carlos Curbelo introduced a carbon tax bill
in 2015 that would use the revenue to replace the federal excise tax on
gasoline and diesel.99 As noted above, the revenue neutral carbon
dividend approach would return carbon tax revenue to citizens rather
than creating government revenue.
The GND does not identify funding strategies for the expansive new
government programs.100 Promoting technology, helping low income
communities cope with higher energy prices, providing job guarantees,
and moving the country rapidly to a low-carbon future will require
major public and private sector investments. Climate mitigation policies
do not have to create the revenue necessary to implement the policies.
Indeed, many government programs rely on general tax dollars rather
than generate funds themselves. Representative Ocasio-Cortez
suggested that a new wealth tax could fund GND policies.101
Disputes over the fiscal aspects of a climate policy may be more
impactful than the disputes over technology policies or social justice
policies. There could be compromises on technology and social justice. In
contrast, funding new climate and social policies through general tax
revenues, or funding them with government revenues at all, may prove
to be a dealbreaker for advocates of revenue-neutral policies. Other
stakeholders may reject climate policy options that do not include
funding to support technology research and development or address the
social and economic impacts of the policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The GND does not resolve the conflicts identified in this Essay. Yet,
the framework has already made an important contribution by changing
the narrative about climate policy in 2019.102 Rather than dismissing
climate change as a national problem, many policymakers and
stakeholders responded to the GND proposal by debating questions such
as whether ten years is too quick to transform the energy sector or
whether nuclear energy has a role in a low carbon future.103 The OcasioCortez–Markey Resolution earned 98 cosponsors in the House of
Representatives and, as noted above, many Democratic presidential

99 Noah Kaufman et al., Emission, Energy, and Economic Implications of the Curbelo
Carbon Tax Proposal (Columbia SIPA, Ctr. on Glob. Pol’y Working Paper, 2018),
https://perma.cc/V8DZ-SUSV.
100 Republican opponents of the GND cite a cost of $93 trillion, even though the number
has no basis and the GND remains a concept rather than a specific proposal. Zack
Colman, The Bogus Number at the Center of the GOP’s Green New Deal Attacks, POLITICO
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/B9HY-ASRF.
101 Tom DiChristopher, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Floats 70% Tax on Wealthy to Pay for
‘Green New Deal, CNBC (Jan. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/TQ3K-ZX9P.
102 Grandoni, supra note 11.
103 See, e.g., John Cassidy, The Good News about a Green New Deal, NEW YORKER (Mar.
4, 2019), https://perma.cc/4YGX-YVLL.
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candidates endorsed the GND concept.104 Mitigating climate change will
require much more than a non-binding resolution, white papers, and
editorials, but the GND may prove to be a critical step in creating a
policy window to address the policy conflicts that have frustrated
adoption of federal climate legislation.
Starting with a broad vision about social justice and environmental
policy, rather than focusing on political viability at the outset, has
helped the GND earn the attention of the media and stakeholders. It
reframes climate change as a critical social challenge rather than simply
an environmental problem. Expanding the policy goals GHG reductions
could allow engaging different constituencies with different arguments.
Stakeholders could see tangible benefits in terms of jobs, reduced
burdens from local pollution (due to retiring fossil fuel-fired power
plants), and greater opportunities for directing the future of their
respective communities (via the just transition emphasis).
An important question for GND proponents is whether they will
insist on achieving all of the goals at one time. The strategic choice to
present the GND as a package of general ideas rather than specific
policy proposals creates the opportunity to find consensus among
supporters of climate policy. The original New Deal did not come about
via one statute and it is likely that any elements of the GND that
become law would do so through different statutes, as well.
GND proponents may be able to find common ground on some
provisions while agreeing to hold other issues for later debates. For
example, carbon pricing can play a role in a broader social and
environmental policy framework or it can be deployed in a narrower
manner focusing on a particular sector or in a policy approach that
focuses solely, or primarily, at carbon pollution. A conservative think
tank argues for incorporating a carbon tax into the GND,105 and a
former Obama Administration official argues that a carbon tax
approach is “the original GND.”106 The proponents of the CLC Carbon
Dividend Plan or the GND may still engage in discussions about the
merits of carbon pricing and potentially reach agreement on at least one
aspect of a comprehensive climate mitigation strategy. Other coalitions
could emerge to pursue other social justice and environmental goals.
There is also an inherent tension between the rapid
decarbonization called for in the GND, inclusive community
participation, environmental protection, and procedural and corrective
justice goals.107 How willing would GND proponents be to compromise
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107 J.B. Ruhl, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets the Old Green Laws?, AM.
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on procedural protections such as streamlining NEPA, the purpose of
which is to examine environmental impacts in detail before acting,
which is the opposite of moving quickly? Involving local communities in
decisions that will affect their futures is important, but it is also timeconsuming. If urgent action is the priority, that tension must be
addressed.
But the hard questions are not reserved only for GND proponents.
Climate policies, including a revenue neutral carbon tax, aim to speed
the transition to clean energy technologies. People are already losing
jobs throughout the coal value chain—coal mines, coal-fired power
plants, and rail.108 If alternatives to the GND do not recognize that the
energy transition is an economic transition, they will likely continue to
struggle with building the types of coalitions necessary to adopt new
legislation. Furthermore, if they do manage to achieve new legislation,
relying on a carbon price may be insufficient to support the type of
research and development necessary to achieve breakthrough energy
technologies.
These disagreements do not alter the fundamental facts about
climate change. Global GHG emissions continue to rise, and a steady
stream of academic studies point to alarming impacts of unabated
emission increases.109 The failure to address climate change will
undoubtedly create profound social impacts. While stakeholders may
support different end goals, the emergence of the GND and new carbon
pricing proposals are a refreshing change from the stalemate of the past
decade and could create opportunities to resolve the disputes that have
created barriers to an effective national climate policy.
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